Towards an Ethics of Sexual Differences by Migliorini, Damiano
Ricerca Psicoanalitica | pISSN 1827-4625 | Year XXXI, n. 2, 2020
doi:10.4081/rp.2020.252
Towards an Ethics of Sexual Differences
Damiano Migliorini*
AbStRAct. – the author analyzes the origin and meaning of the expression ‘Ethics of Sexual
Difference’ (ESD), contextualising it in the paradigm ‘thought of Sexual Difference’, in
which the potentiality and aporias arising from the debate within the feminist movement are
highlighted. Possible interpretations of these ethics, developed in the Italian philosophical
context, are illustrated and evaluated. the author proposes a critical comparison with other
models, for example, the queer theories, and attempts to show how the ‘thought of Sexual
Difference’ (tSD) opens itself to destabilization produced by the emergence of new subjects
(gay and lesbian, transgender, intersex) and their corresponding scientific knowledge. the
author therefore proposes an update to the plural, ‘Ethics of Sexual Difference’ (ESDs), list-
ing the possible methodological and content assumptions (including the development of a
relational model in all scientific disciplines) and the disciplinary implications (also in the
psychoanalytic field) of an ethics so defined. A reference is made to the discussion of so-
called gender ideology, in which the protagonists have often showed a certain difficulty in
implementing an ethics of differences.
Keywords: Sexual difference, ethics, gender studies, feminism, nature-nurture debate. 
Ethics of sexual difference: origin and meaning of the terms
the expression ‘Ethics of Sexual Difference’ (ESD) and the related con-
cept anticipated by Virginia Woolf and Simone de beauvoir is usually asso-
ciated with Luce Irigaray’s 1985 work with the same title (Italian translation
1987). Irigaray, with Juliet Mitchell (1976), directed radical criticism
towards the psychoanalytic thought of Freud and Lacan (cf. Irigaray, 1976;
De carneri, 2019). Her work occupies a place in so-called ‘thought of
Sexual Difference’ (tSD) from which we will now trace a set of parameters.
Regarding feminist ethics, where one current is centred on the theme of
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emancipation, and one is based on an appreciation of female specificity
(Guaraldo, 2008, p. 87), ESD belongs to the latter, and is associated in turn
with Gilligan’s Ethics of Care (1987), according to which women and men
develop moral reasoning differently in relation to the method and content
(Guaraldo, 2008, p. 89). the presumed specificity of the female is, more-
over, one of the salient features of tSD. In fact, in her work, Irigaray (1987)
denounces the reduction of the feminine to the masculine, where the femi-
nine is considered relative to the masculine. 
In Irigaray’s work (1987), ESD mirrors and at the same time delves
deeper into the already forming tSD; it assumes a respect for the feminine,
and the need to allow women to tell their story, and to build feminine social-
ity and community where self-love may be learnt (through mother-daughter
relationships and relationships among women). tSD’s aim is not homolo-
gation with the masculine – even if tSD does not reject the social achieve-
ments in terms of equal access to resources (tommasi, 2019; cf. Diotima,
1987) – but “arises from women’s need to freely seek expression, political
practice, actions faithful to their desires” (Zamboni, 2015) and bodies. It is
animated by a passion for sexual difference: born out of the individual expe-
rience of each woman who expresses her point of view, embodied and
sexed, on the world. According to tSD female supporters, women have a
specificity regarding the intellectual mechanism - due to the nature of their
bodies and in particular to the experience of pregnancy (Zanardo, 2014) –
and this implies the development of a knowledge, a language and discourse
from two subjects, masculine and feminine, without forgoing the latter for
the sake of the former. tSD refutes equality between men and women
because tSD moves from the premise that irreducible bodies exist on which
irreducible identities depend; a primary ontological difference with respect
to any abstract elaboration. thus, ESD implies the respect relating to the
specificity and reciprocity of two genders, which means making room for
the construction of a world belonging to both sexed subjects.
It is useful to remember that tSD has been highly debated, also in light
of the evolution of feminist thought, as imposed, among many others, by
teresa De Lauretis, Rosi braidotti and Judith butler (exponents of post-
gender thought, or radical feminism, or queer, as appropriate). A first criti-
cism concerns the excessive emphasis given to specific female qualities,
with little consideration of their historical nature and the cultural and per-
formative influence of the dominant language. the criticism is based on
claims that tSD has a naive position with respect to language, and symbolic
codes; tSD talks of nature without problematizing the concept (Zamboni,
2015); it posits a woman’s natural identity – yet continues to deny its uni-
versality – which should be consequent upon her body. At the same time,
De Lauretis and butler stress that each body (and its desire, or its gender
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there are no natural identities, but rather naturalized historical identities;
there are, therefore, majority, but not universal, female specificities. Even
in butler’s analysis, however, the relationship between biological body and
gender identity remains unexplained: the former is unavoidable as well as
it is culturally constructed by gender through its performativity.
to sum up, if tSD prefers to counterpose (reciprocally) a male identity
with a female one, in queer thinking, as it has been variously formulated,
the idea that there is a typical female identity applicable to multiple subjects
is abolished. besides, nobody would think that there is one way of being
male which applies to everyone: we have all experienced the many antithet-
ical ways a male is a man. Why should a female's body be more limiting
than the infinite expressivity of male’s body?
tSD, however, comprises various more or less radical positions (it is
even difficult to know where to place Irigaray herself1). If what matters is
the individual woman’s experience, then tSD is open to queer thinking, rec-
ognizing the unique character of individual experience. this leads to the
second criticism, which concerns the starting point: the tSD cannot be con-
figured as one unambiguous formulation, since among its assumptions is
“no woman can speak for another”, because the risk is that she would create
an objective theory about woman that the tSD would prefer to avoid
(because objectivity is an imposition of the male logos). thus, the tSD
“never dictates stable meanings” (Zanardo, 2015, p. 835), but presents this
postulate: the difference between men and women exists, the way this is
expressed historically depends on female subjectivities. there is an “inerad-
icable but elusive” difference (Zanardo, 2015, p. 836): female thinkers who
identify with tSD believe that “the body is largely unaware, so our experi-
ence of the body cannot be objectified”.2 the experience is elusive even
though the difference between man and woman exists and shows itself in a
clear, ineradicable way.
However, elusiveness is such a corrosive element that it places tSD in
line with the crisis of reason and the universal knowledge, which deter-
mined the “departure from the models of rationality” of western tradition
(colì, 2002, p. 47). this is due to the fact that, by rejecting the codification
of a universal Woman, our thinking begins to wander, it becomes asystem-
atic, closer to subjectivity than to universality. thus, it appears as a practice,
without a Feminine Absolute which would fall back “into a new crystaliza-
tion of thought” (colì, 2002, p. 48). characteristic of women’s thought,
then, “is to be far from the arrogance and the presumption of being able to
represent the absolutes of reason [...] because it is aware of the complexity












and plurality of realities”, accepting destabilization, “which always accom-
panies complexity and multiplicity” (colì, 2002, p. 52). bear in mind that
the tSD originates from a more general thought of difference which,
through different forms of nominalism (cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2019),
intends to valorize the infinite differences of singularities against the ten-
dency to reduce to One, to the System, to the Identical. On the side of
Differences, can be ascribed thinkers such as Scotus, Kierkegaard,
Nietzsche, Deleuze, Derrida. While on the side of the System we find Plato,
Aristotle, thomas, Hegel (to give some emblematic examples).
In this perspective, tSD naturally opens to destabilization that is the prod-
uct of the emergence of new subjects: gay and lesbian, transgender, intersex.
these are bodies that in their own way redefine and disrupt the perimeter of
female gender, completing the work of de-binarization initiated by feminist
thought. However, as we know, post-gender feminist thought – which arises
from these existences and calls into question the alleged naturalness of sex
and desire – has often been rejected by tSD supporters, precisely because of
what they see as a threat to the existence of a female specificity.
colì, on the other hand, sees a form of ESD in the “recognition that the
other man or woman, black or white, catholic or Muslim, is different from
me, accepting that their right to exist […] opens the way to a great possibil-
ity of coexistence for all forms of difference” (colì, 2002, p. 48, italics
added). the so called ethics of care is clearly different: where a definition
of the female essence is difficult or undesirable, the ethics of care tends to
re-propose stereotypes about abstract entities with fixed characteristics. In
order to avoid this risk, far beyond the “respect for diversity” perspective
proposed by colì, has been proposed an ethics of vulnerability, based on a
nomadic subject, not holder of his own actions (Guaraldo, 2008, pp. 96-
100)3. but it is not possible to illustrate this position here.
Other interpretations in the Italian context
Recently, other interpretations of ESD could be found on the Italian scene.
According to Vigna, for example, the ESD is a special case of the ethics of
intersubjectivity, which includes “the general relationship between men and
women inasmuch as they are different genders” (Vigna, 2001, p. 231), recog-
nition of the other as sexed subjectivity (Vigna, 2001, p. 233). Vigna, howev-
er, advances an essentialist interpretation of these ethics since, in his opinion,
males and females have obvious complementary psychological diversity (and
transcendental diversity), although they are each in themselves a totality, i.e.,
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they can exist without union with the other sex. the encounter between desir-
ing subjectivities, then, can be conflictual (relationship of domination where
difference is used as a weapon) or of mutual recognition (the difference is ful-
filled by mutual giving) (Vigna, 2001, pp. 240-241).
Although Vigna rules out the possibility that ESD is an ethics of sexual
behavior, there are elements in his text that suggest this is not the case. For
example, he interprets homosexuality as a closure to the opposite sex and as
an “extreme of predatory transgression”, as opposed to fertility, which is an
“extreme of grateful integration” (Vigna, 2001, p. 247). by contrast, there-
fore, the ESD becomes an ethics of the heterosexual couple, where the part-
ners recognize themselves as equal in their difference, whatever internal order
the couple creates (roles are freely attributed) (Vigna, 2001, pp. 249-253). In
Vigna, however, it appears clear that subjects have distinct roles assigned by
nature. A dubious position, since it has not been proven that particular atti-
tudes correspond to particular bodies (Migliorini, 2017, pp. 57-61).
For Fanciullacci (2010, p. 9), on the other hand, ESD cannot invent
“rules and regulations [...] to manage the couple’s relationship in a morally
acceptable way [...]”. Rather, this ethics must be built around the recogni-
tion of singularities, with the awareness that “the current crisis of a more or
less unitary order of possible answers to the question of difference triggers
a multiplication of these answers: men and women exercise more freedom,
at least in choosing among the many possibilities, if not in the invention of
a trajectory of their own” (Fanciullacci, 2010, pp. 53-54).
According to boella, difference can become exclusion when it is essen-
tialized as a universal: “Yet, difference is liberating when it no longer sig-
nifies an excluding deviance, petrification into one nature and fixed charac-
ters, but specificity, variation, heterogeneity” (boella, 2008 , p. 5). As we
pointed out, boella also claimed that the object of ethics is the existence of
women – not of Woman – a place of multiple, complex, even contradictory
experiences (boella, 2008, p. 5). boella maintains that, since Irigaray, ESD
is the “destruction of the patriarchal order and the reconstruction of the
symbolic order in the name of a woman’s freedom to be herself” (boella,
2008, p. 8). this interpretation is well suited to the finality to which an ESD
can aspire for all sexual minorities. It is not a feminist ethics nor does it
relate to female morality where these expressions indicate an ethics devel-
oped from certain female sensitivities (boella, 2008, p. 10). In general
terms, therefore, “difference is a value. Not only as regards content (virtues,
female qualities [...]), but as a form of feeling, thinking and acting, valid for
the construction of humans”. An EDS which is “philosophically radical
calls for a transformation of oneself, one’s gaze and attitude towards the
world: new values emerge from the shadows [...] secular invisibilities of the
female world are redeemed”(boella, 2008, p. 17). this ethics is a funda-











From singular to plural
Sometimes a different interpretation of ESD emerges through the texts,
i.e., as a safeguard for heterosexuality and dimorphism, as well as a safeguard
for a set of ways of being men and women (gender roles).4 Ricci Sindoni, for
example, gives voice to the fears of many thinkers (although, under the
umbrella term androgynous, she is confusing between issues that must be
considered separately, such as sexual orientation, gender roles, fashions, her-
maphroditism5) stressing that, in her view, safeguarding humanity consists of
safeguarding the existence of dimorphism, heterosexuality, and the gender
roles that result from them both (Ricci Sindoni, 2008, pp. 46-47).
If this fear is the unsaid of some authors who reflect on these issues, it
is better to be explicit about it. the unconscious fears that lead to producing
very confused writing should be made conscious. In line with the concerns
expressed by Ricci Sindoni, for example, there is also the recent document
of the congregation for catholic Education (2019), which sums up the men-
tality of many publications from this same culture. the document states that
gender culture (unspecied) would “tend to dismiss the differences between
man and woman as being simply the effect of historical-cultural condition-
ing” (n. 1). the catholic world, therefore, is concerned that the differences
between men and women may be erased. Which differences are being
referred to is unclear. they can hardly mean corporeal differences, since
these are present at birth and there is no denial of dimorphism in gender cul-
ture. the reference is probably to a series of attitudes, roles, behaviors (etc.)
that should belong naturally to a woman. Gender culture does, in fact, rel-
ativize these differences, demonstrating that they are often relative to a par-
ticular culture and time period. What feminisms want to achieve is freedom
for the individual woman to express herself in the way she considers appro-
priate for herself.
We have seen that even tSD, from which the document draws its lexicon
(but stereotyping the contents!), does not push for the identification of uni-
versal characteristics, but invites women to find their own unique and unre-
peatable existential trajectory. the document underestimates the fact that all
philosophical positions in the feminist debate, uphold both the existence of
a given body, on the one hand, and the cultural influence exercised on the
body, on the other. the mystery of this interaction does not allow for the
identification of a natural for all women, while admitting that the body is
an inescapable factor of influence. Gender cultures – the plural is essential
4Ricci Sindoni (2008, p. 30) speaks of safeguarding heterosexuality (2008, p. 41).
5Ricci Sindoni (p. 25) forgets that the Androgyn myth speaks of love between persons
of the same sex. Greek myths are «a comment on every important aspect of life» (casertano,
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if we want to avoid reducing the plurality of voices to a fetish – affirm the
need to create a society in which every person determines how to live their
own identity.
the document goes on to argue that gender culture “denies the natural
difference and reciprocity between men and women” (n. 2). About the term
difference we said enough: in gender theories the difference between individ-
uals, of which the male-female difference is part, is never denied. certainly,
natural reciprocity – understood as heterosexuality – between man and
woman is denied. Refusing heteronormativity (the man-woman couple des-
tiny), however, does not mean wanting to erase heterosexuality. A symbolic
negation is not a material negation and it is pernicious to confuse them
(Migliorini, 2018, pp. 189-193). to date, neither heterosexuality nor dimor-
phism are threatened by anything. At best, greater visibility is given to some
sexual identities since they have only now (re)gained a voice, while remain-
ing percentage minorities. Furthermore, feminisms and LGbt* movements
do not question the order of generations (no-one calls for incest!), nor the
order of generation (bisexual), although some advocate the widening of the
possibilities of filiation (which is also social, and conventional).
the biological masculine and feminine, from the point of view of the
human species, are ontologically necessary, since the human form is embod-
ied in them in order to reproduce itself; or, until now at least it has assumed
this reproductive strategy. Recognizing that other healthy sexual identities can
love (biological or psychicological, or both) can love, is not a threat to the
existence of the ontological datum. Of course, some philosophical specula-
tions hypothesize future changes in the human reproductive strategy through
technology, where one of the two sexes is no longer required. Here, however,
we we enter in the field of political critical theories, but it seems not to be the
case that the problem of the ESD, to date, is to guarantee the existence of
dimorphism (as a reproductive strategy) and heterosexuality (or, at least,
bisexuality) as its affective correlative. that is, there is no immediate risk of
one sex deciding to cancel out the other. Some feminist or so-called post-
humanism thought has gone as far as to imagine this dystopian future – a
humanity made of hybrid human beings, hermaphrodite, synthesis of the two
sexes and capable of reproduction – but these are mental experiments, used
critically to demolish false naturalizations.6 they are most definitely not the
current claims of women or the LGbt* movements.
Purely speculatively, however, we can ask ourselves whether sexual dif-
ference is essential for human beings (Vigna, 2008, p. 67). Again, as a pure
mental experiment, humanity made of hermaphrodites capable of reproduc-
ing themselves would still be fully human. these mental experiments make











our being in this world, in male and female forms (mainly), even more mys-
terious. the existence of a humanity without males and females, however,
is not a problem currently. today, an ESD should be concerned about what
nature has already offered to thought over thousands of years: the existence
of many natural sexual (physical and psychological) identities, loves and
methods of filiation.
tSD feminists stress that sexual difference is the original difference, and
the sexual body allows for different male and female experiences (Zanardo,
2010, pp. 163-212). the argument may be acceptable, in preserving its
undoubted theoretical and historical merits, if it is extended to and realized
for each body, as proposed by the theologian Vantini (2019). After recalling
that existential evidence of homosexual love unmasks the illusion of the
universal-heterosexual paradigm and of the hetero-centric ordered lan-
guages, Vantini maintains that contact with queer subjects leads us “to
speak, think and act in a new way, with [...] a real respect for the differences
between us. In this game of relationships, however, no-one should ever
speak to the floor in place of another”. Vantini points out that although sex-
ual difference is fundamental, given that each thought is sexed, the problem
“concerns what we understand by this difference”; if we squeeze it on
essentialism, without “paying attention to the desires and freedom of real
women and men”, we forget that
“the sense of difference, according to Genesis, is in God’s safe keeping. It is not
available to human beings who would like to make immediate use of it. the [...]
issue of sexual difference does not coincide with the issue of heterosexuality.
[...] We cannot call into question sexual difference to reconfirm and safeguard a
world of exclusionary practices which insists on pretending not to see the com-
plexity of the biographies”.
Here tSD and queer thoughts find convergence (cf. Migliorini, 2020). If
we accept that women and men experience different forms of love (inside
themselves, outside themselves ...), this also applies to other bodies (think of
passive homosexuals). It is therefore essential to safeguard (allow the full
experience) the specificity and survival of each bodily experience. this
does not consist in exhalting one at the expense of others, but in safeguard-
ing all of them while accepting the fact that, to date, some experiences are
predominant.
the experience of the world through sexualization is therefore funda-
mental, and in most cases people experience the world initially from a male
or female body; but there are several other bodies and sexual identities that
do not come under this binarism (entium varietates non temere esse minu-
endas). What does a transgender person experience during the course of his
bodily transition? What does a passive homosexual, or a lesbian woman
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dresses or occasionally practices homosexual behavior, what kind of psy-
chic reality do they encounter, what kind of phenomenological curvature do
they give to their encounter with reality?
It should be evident that our position here is akin to that of boella and
colì’s, but without forsaking the human capacity to universalise. the latter
has turned out to be too profitable in our millennial study of the world to be
abandoned hastily. However, we can and must seek a fair balance between the
unsustainable epistemic subjectivism of certain feminist speculation and the
equally distorted objectivism of male (and scientific) thought. We have to
keep in mind that, when we develop models, systems, universals, the result is
always an approximation. the reality and those systems fail to match. the
human subject constantly defies categorization, notwithstanding that, within
limits, it is possible to describe a subject through universal categories. In the
history of thought the elusiveness or uniqueness of a person with respect to
universals has been expressed in various ways: the incommunicability of the
essence in thomas; haecceity in Scotus; that single individual in
Kierkegaard; the Face in Lévinas; natality that creates plurality (the roots of
politics) in Arendt. the ethics of differences could then concern precisely this
awareness, which is epistemic and ethical at the same time.
the shift from the singular, ‘Ethics of Sexual Difference’ to the plural,
‘Ethics of Sexual Differences’ is therefore also inevitable for the tSD,
given the theoretical premises we have seen. Ethics in the plural, to use
colì’s words again, eludes “the ever-present temptation to make the other’s
essence clearer and more evident in order to align it to ourselves”. the
other person retains “an invisible part of herself [...] not conformable to our
self, given the impossibility of knowing the other definitively and any def-
inition would be unable to convey the uniqueness of what it seeks to
define” (colì, 2002, pp. 56-57).
Fundamentals of an ethics of sexual differences:
disciplinary implementations
can the position outlined above really be an Ethics of Sexual
Differences (ESDs)? the question is legitimate, since, when speaking of a
generic acceptance of a person in her uniqueness, this ethics seems a copy
of the ethics of responsibility. How is an ESDs distinguishable from a
generic invitation to accept the other? We don’t find the difference neither
in the method, nor in the content (which varies over time), but in its aim:
safeguarding the freedom of sexual minorities. Our reasoning now returns
to the dispute, mentioned briefly above, concerning the existence of a fem-
inist ethics. I believe that the latter’s specificity is its purpose, the liberation











women experience freedom just as a man experiences it. Likewise, the
ESDs’ goal should be the liberation of sexual minorities in all the areas in
which it is implemented.
the ESDs could then be implemented into an ‘ethics of ethical produc-
tion’, which means listening to the complexity of situations, medical and
psychotherapeutic practices, the variety of theoretical positions (anthropo-
logical, philosophical), the complexity of life lived in a thousand psychic
forms, which frequently require personalized intervention. this attentive
listening is propaedeutic to the formulation of ethical positions. As argued
elsewhere, catholic culture has often made the mistake of constructing
ethics on partial scientific or medical data, or on anthropology created from
an inaccurate phenomenology based on the partial observation of reality
(Migliorini, 2018, pp. 232-243). Ethics cannot be separated from anthropol-
ogy, which consists precisely in describing who humans are, what are their
characteristics, but also how they come to be formed (within different cul-
tures). to do this, it is necessary to know which human beings exist, how
universal humanity is realized in the material individuals. then, it is rational
investigation (scientific, but not limited to this) which determines which
psycho-physical configurations can be considered healthy. this determina-
tion, through trial and error, through shifting scientific and cultural bound-
aries, does not relinquish the essential reference to criteria, which are as
objective as possible (cf. Migliorini, 2019). Having established these con-
figurations, we need to explain the transition from a common nature to the
intrinsic variability of individual nature, and how it occurs.
An example of the betrayal of this ‘ethics of ethical production’ is the
recent document of the congregation for catholic Education mentioned
above. Rather confused and imprecise in mixing concepts and issues,7 at
times even embarrassing, the document suggests that homosexuality that
homosexuality is a radically autonomous individual choice (sic!). In many
parts, at least in the listening and reasoning section, the writers seem to
have not the slightest idea what they are talking about.
In the determination of an adequate anthropology, human sciences and
metaphysics come to our aid. today, in almost all disciplines, the relational
(non-relativistic) model is prevalent. this model implies a structurally rela-
tional view of entities in formation, which include the sexual body and the
human identity. It is not a relationalist vision in which everything is reduced
to relationships. Rather, co-primacy of the substantial and relational compo-
nent is established in the event of a phenomenon. It is the mystery of the
ontological datum which goes through a relational-existential adventure. In
relation to human nature, what can we know about this mystery? Probably
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very little. Perhaps we can simply see the results, i.e., the psycho-corporeal
forms that emerge from the relational dynamic that the various sciences
help us to understand, even if only partially.
the body is structured relationally and culturally. Psychological, envi-
ronmental and biological factors interact in a complex way to determine a
person’s sexual identity. Starting from the biological body, these factors,
intertwining, determine a nuclear gender identity with which it combines to
create a series of internalized gender roles and an affective orientation. the
individual is the result of an unpredictable relational process that structures
different forms of relationships (from the biochemical to the emotional, to
the socio-cultural). the body is a set of potentialities and predispositions on
which (from the start) the relational process acts.8 the fascinating mystery
that surrounds sexual identity is associated with its constancy in producing
certain configurations (for example heterosexuality) from this potential
base and the unpredictablity of relationships,9 and the equally mysterious
constancy in producing minorities, functional and healthy configurations.
the natural process of identity building, in a variety of positive outcomes,
leads to the formation of the subject’s stable structural nuclei, and presents
remarkable plasticity with respect to other levels of subject’s personal iden-
tity. Identity is therefore made up of deeper (in the long run, innate) or more
superficial elements. Sexual orientation or nuclear gender identity tend to
be nuclear components of sexual identity, while gender roles are secondary,
acquired through socialization (primary and secondary).
We are concerned with understanding the cultural element as one of the
relational levels in the unresolved dispute between nature and nurture
(Goldhaber, 2012). Nature (the given) and culture (the given in relation) are
two ways of looking at the same entity, not two interacting entities. they are
two differential factors that to us are posited as indivisible. Relationships pro-
gressively progressively allow the penetration of the culture-society into
nature, also through attachments to significant figures. Nature, therefore, is a
broad field of potentialities (and resistances) made an individual nature
through relational processes.10 Preserving the mystery of individual configu-
rations which determine socialization and relationality of the body could be
ESDs’ task.
the ‘ethics of ethical production’ also means that, when developing an
ethical argument on gender, the gender model that one adopts needs to be
made explicit, and the level at which one intends to direct an argument
8It is now an acquired knowledge, for example, that homosexuality is determined by a
complex multi-genetic predisposition, which can however be actualized only in certain
environmental contexts (cf. Ganna, 2019).
9In a relational approach the outcomes are probabilistic, there is no rigid determinism.











needs to be specified (Ferrari, 2018, pp. 121 -146). ‘Gender’, in fact, is a
multifactorial instrument: ‘gender’ can denote a general level (including,
for example, gender orders or regimes), or one of the micro areas in which
gender identities allow themselves to be analyzed, like the psychological
one, where we have nuclear gender identity or internalized gender roles.
to illustrate this point, we can formulate an example of the different levels
of application of one’s argumentation: societies tend to be conservative in their
socialization processes (at least until today), they perpetrate gender regimes
and therefore transmit gender roles – traditionally attributed to the genres they
recognize – to the new generations. A modern and liberal society should seek
to maintain this feature of societies, to which is added the contibution of edu-
cational institutions who supply individual subjects, according to their age,
with the tools (batini & Santoni, 2009; Ghigi, 2019) to develop a critical
approach to inherited gender roles,11 in order to build their own approach
freely and consciously. this means accepting that in adulthood people can
experience gender roles differently to those of the canons of a society. From
butler we learn that these people destabilize gender, in the sense that they sug-
gest to the generations possible life experiences, highlighting the false natural-
izations, and therefore influencing all levels of socialization by modifying the
cultural transmission of traditional models. Such creation and transmission of
new gender models (internalized gender roles) should not, however, be con-
fused with other phenomena, such as transsexuality, which (as far as we know)
has to do with nuclear gender identity, not with gender roles.
ESDs are, therefore, not simply an attitude of acceptance (albeit funda-
mental), but has a practical and a public-institutional side which consists in
the training of operators, teachers, medical specialists and general practi-
tioners, and psychologists of all schools of thought, not only those who
intervene in cases of transsexuality or intersexuality. Sexual differences are
encountered on all social levels; skills and sensitivity are required on the
part of the subjects involved to provide effective and appropriate reception.
Needless to say: much work remains to be done, given the widespread igno-
rance about scientific knowledge related to sexual identity issues.
For the therapists, ESDs implies some imperatives: continuing educa-
tion and personal research or study. these ethics provide an indispensable
perspective in the field of psycholanalysis. It implies the crafting of a rela-
tionship – in clinical practice – marked by respect for the other’s identity.
the task of therapists is to remind ourselves that the task of therapists is
to lead patients to discover their identity, and propose therapeutic paths
that will afford them the best possible psycho-physical well-being, with-
11Education differs from socialization in that it is a consciously undertaken process
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out imposing their own preconceptions (philosophical, religious, cultur-
al). In the following words, expressed with such clarity that no further
comment is required, the therapist
“has the task of helping the patient to ‘clarify their gender orientation’ by making
it easier for them to listen to their bodies, their experiences [...]. From this listen-
ing and the integration of the levels, this person will discover their gender orien-
tation. [...] A therapist is good and is really helpful if he respects the other [...]: any
manipulation [...] wanting to impose the therapist’s choices or values on the other
is ethical incorrectness and professional incompetence. [...] the ethics of a thera-
pist is profound respect for the person, so they do not impose – either explicitly or
implicitly (this is professionalism) – values and ideologies that do not belong to
the inner world (body, experiences) of the person. It is clear that therapists have
their own anthropology and their own ethics […] but respect for the patient’s per-
sonal path to a discovery of their gender orientation actually belongs to the pro-
fessional competence and ethics of caring”(Salonia, 2019).12
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& Vita, supplement to Avvenire, 29 Sept., 12-13.
conflict of interest: the authors declare no potential conflict of interests.
Ethics approval and consent to participate: the manuscript does not contain any elements that would
allow the recognition of the patient.
Received for publication: 3 March 2020.
Accepted for publication: 5 May 2020.
©copyright: the Author(s), 2020
Licensee PAGEPress, Italy
Ricerca Psicoanalitica 2020; XXXI:252
doi:10.4081/rp.2020.252
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License (by-nc 4.0) which permits any noncommercial use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
No
n-c
om
me
rci
al 
us
e o
nly
No
n-c
om
me
rci
al 
us
e o
nly
